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The popularity of wireless mobile communication with enormous production
of smart devices and applications increases the number of users in the wire-
less network. This increase of mobile users in the wireless network results
insatiable demand for additional bandwidth. To improve network capacity of
mobile operators efficient use of spectrum is critical. To improve the system
capacity of operators and to provide flexible use of spectrum, we investigate a
localized spectrum sharing between operators located at the same geographical area.
We provide a coordination mechanism for operators to form a common spectrum
pool and to use it dynamically. The coordination between the operators is modeled
using a game theoretical approach in a non-cooperative basis. We study the
spectrum sharing at localized and non-localized level, where at localized level
operators agree on spectrum sharing at small scale. In localized spectrum sharing
operators share their spectrum at smaller areas, when compared to non-localized
spectrum sharing.
Through numerical simulation, we analyze the performance of localized and non-
localized spectrum sharing in comparison to the default orthogonal spectrum sharing
mechanism. From the simulation results, we conclude that localized spectrum
sharing outperforms non-localized spectrum sharing. Thus, spectrum sharing at
smaller areas provides a better performance improvement than spectrum sharing
at larger geographical areas.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the history of mobile communication, the first-generation mobile network appeared
in the 1980s, GSM followed in the 1990s, 10 years later 3G arrived, LTE the 4th
generation joined the industry in around 2010 and then 5G is on the way. Every ten
years the mobile network technology shows an advancement, diffusing around the
world rapidly. Following the evolution, wireless mobile communication has become
widespread and an essential part of our day-to-day life. The invention of massive
wireless devices, smart phones, tablets, and applications facilitates to enormous
mobile network users to join the wireless mobile network communication. By 2021,
it is expected that the number of internet-connected devices will be three times as
high as the global population [9].
Figure 1: Global Monthly Traffic Forecast 2016-2021 [1]
According to the 2016 Cisco Mobile Visual Networking Index forecast [1], mobile
data traffic will grow sevenfold from 2016 to 2021. The forecast estimates that the
mobile data that accounted for 8% of internet traffic in 2016, will account for 20%
by end of 2021. As shown in Figure 1, it is mobile video data that shows the highest
growth reaching 38 exabytes per month followed by mobile web/Data/VoIP. The
given forecast indicates that at the end of year 2021, the mobile video will account for
78% of mobile data traffic. This is due to the accelerated increment in the number
of mobile users.
2The exponential growth of wireless devices and wireless based applications in-
creases the mobile data traffic globally. The bandwidth requirement for this huge
data traffic in the network usually exceeds the available network capacity. To improve
the end-user experience, it has become a necessity to extend the available network
capacity. Thus, the explosive growth in data traffic is fueling the demand for more
spectrum capacity daily. However, spectrum is a finite and nonrenewable scarce
resource. Even though service providers are investing to remain competitive in the
market of wireless mobile communication, it is very costly to get a license for new
band of spectrum.
A most recent NTIA’s report on frequency allocations in the United States, shows
that within the current spectrum regulatory framework there is a huge scarcity of
unallocated spectrum [10]. The chart given in Figure 2 shows the frequency allocation
in the United States in September 2015. Traditionally, a portion of spectrum is
statically assigned to a specific service or mobile operator to use it exclusively for
a long time, which is called Fixed Spectrum Allocation (FSA). In FSA, mobile
operators typically own certain bands of spectrum dedicated to their own users. One
can observe from the figure that there are huge blocks of spectrum dedicated to
broadcasting and a lot of frequency ranges assignment relied on FSA policy.
This static allocation of the spectrum has limited flexibility of the spectrum
usage and degraded spectral efficiency. Consequently, many researches and recent
measurements indicate that there are part of assigned licensed spectrum left unused or
underutilized for most of the time [11, 12]. In addition to the shortage of unallocated
spectrum, inefficient spectrum utilization is the main reason for the current spectrum
scarcity. This is due to the fact that lack of flexibility in the statically assigned
spectrum bands results in low spectral efficiency. Spectrum allocation is one of
the key issues to improve spectrum efficiency and has become the hot topic in the
research of cognitive wireless network.
For decades, the FSA has been working well but nowadays the imbalance between
available resource and demand growth has become a huge problem. It might be
possible that at a certain time or place, the allocated spectrum for a system is
unutilized, while at the same time there may be a heavily loaded system demand-
ing for more bandwidth. In [13], it has been shown that causes a huge waste of
resources. This ineffective utilization of the resource demands a better approach to
get the best out of the available licensed spectrum. Spectrum sharing and heteroge-
nous networks are two of the most promising solution to address the spectrum scarcity.
Spectrum sharing refers to the common use a specific range of spectrum simulta-
neously by multiple wireless system entities located at the same geographical area.
Sharing of a spectrum allows operators or spectrum license holders to give access
to their unused spectrum for other users under some agreed conditions [6]. This
sharing strategy enables dynamic management of spectrum and maximizes spectrum
utilization efficiency.
3Figure 2: United States Frequency Allocation Chart [2]
Heterogeneous network (HetNet) is a network that comprises different types of
cells with different downlink transmit powers and overlapping coverage areas. HetNet
refers to the densification of small cells in the existing macro cell network. The
instalment of these low power and less radius small cell base station in the network
improves the network coverage. The spectrum sharing between the macro cell and
the small cells in the network provides additional network capacity without need for
extra bandwidth. Therefore, applying spectrum sharing in heterogeneous network
environments brings solution for spectrum scarcity and utilization efficiency problem.
1.2 Objective of the Thesis
The problem of spectrum sharing between multiple operators located in the same
geographical area is studied in this thesis. In small cell areas, especially indoors e.g.
office, restaurant, shopping mall, and school, frequent variation of traffic is common.
With dynamic spectrum sharing operators can improve their capacity as well as
QoS delivered to end users. However, in a situation where operators operate in the
same geographic area they will experience inter-operator interference on the shared
spectrum. To minimize the risk of inter operator interference we propose a local-
ized spectrum sharing mechanism to regulate the sharing of resources between MNOs.
We use game theory to coordinate the interaction between the operators. Game
theory provides a mathematical framework to analyze interaction between indepen-
4dent decision-makers [14]. The interaction between the operators is assumed to be
non-cooperative, i.e, operators act independently, because operators are competitive
by nature and are not interested to share operator specific information.
In this thesis, localized and non-localized spectrum sharing mechanisms are stud-
ied among HetNet mobile operators that coexist in the same geographical area.
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate spectrum sharing in various
geographical settings. The thesis aims to find out whether or not the spectrum
sharing at small scale results in a better performance improvement than large scale
spectrum sharing. The small-scale spectrum sharing defines the spectrum sharing at
smaller areas which are summed up to form the large common geographic area which
defines the large-scale spectrum sharing. The thesis aims to show to what extent
small scale spectrum sharing makes a difference. To achieve the thesis objectives, we
perform numerical simulation and observe the performance of the different spectrum
sharing scenarios.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Theoretical backgrounds related to this
thesis is presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamental concepts in heterogeneous networks. The
architecture and type of cells in heterogeneous networks are presented. This chapter
covers also the advantage and challenges. Chapter 3 presents a brief introduction to
the basic principles of a spectrum sharing and the game theory used for spectrum
sharing.
In Chapter 4, the location-based spectrum sharing mechanism is introduced and
explained in detail. The system model for the localized and non-localized spectrum
sharing mechanism is presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 focused on the simulation environment and the achieved results are
discussed comparing to the static spectrum allocation scheme.
Chapter 6 concludes this work and envisions future work directions.
52 Heterogeneous Networks
2.1 Introduction
As the future forecasts, the number of networked devices and connection in the world
will reach 24 billion by 2019 [15]. According to research and industry forecasts, the
demand for cellular broadband data is increasing as the number of internet users
and massive connected devices.
Ericsson envisions that there will be 50 billion connected devices by 2020 [16].
Users replace their home desktop with smartphones and tablets to make video calls,
download videos, and transfer data and so on. These applications served by service
providers consume more bandwidth than before. At the same time, users demand a
high capacity, reliable and fast service with affordable price from their service provider
regardless of their location and application they are using. In order to cope with the
dramatic growth of customer demand and overcome the limits of existing cellular
networks, it is necessary for operators to increase the data capacity and their network
coverage significantly. Over the past few years, network densification works as a
solution. This creates a hybrid system where the existing macro base stations overlaid
with a low power and less coverage small cells called Heterogeneous networks (HetNet).
The idea of Heterogeneous Network (HetNet) has emerge due to mobile operators
necessity to get the ability to operate in networks which contain various radio access
technologies in combiation with different types of cells with different sizes and formats
operating seamlessly [17]. HetNet combines different radio technologies, base station
types and transmission power levels to meet the growing demand of data capacity and
improve network coverage. Presently more than 80% of mobile traffic originates from
indoor users [18] and customers expect to receive a better network coverage irrespec-
tive of their location. Thus, with the deployment of indoor and outdoor small cells
HetNet plays a significant role to achieve a better subscriber and user experience es-
pecially for indoor and cell edge users. Installing femtocell access points in residential
buildings allows to improve indoor users experience. At hot spot and rural areas Micro
base stations deployed to fill coverage holes and provide capacity demands. Pico base
stations usually deployed at cell edge to deliver high quality services to cell edge users.
In HetNet architecture, several base stations of different sizes and transmission
power level such as Macro cells and small cells, deployed throughout the whole
network. Typical deployment of HetNet can be depicted in Figure 3.
Small Cells
Small cell is an umbrella term for low power wireless access points. In HetNet Small
cells are a vital component, which provides efficient and cost-effective solution for
load balancing by offloading the macro cellular traffic. Small cell enhances cellular
6Figure 3: Heterogeneous Network [3]
capacity and network coverage for home users, small medium enterprises, and rural
public places. Small cells are served by types of base station or node, which comes in
variety of coverage ranges, transmit power and size different, decreasing order from
microcell base station to Femtocell access point.
The integration of small cells with macro cell in a network brings an enhancement
in overall system performance. For service providers, HetNet deployment is of
special interest with the aim of guaranteeing high quality and improve network
capacity for high data rate services to increasing numbers of users. Comparing with
a homogeneous macro cellular network, a small cell-based heterogeneous networks
is much more energy efficient and cost effective. In high macro cells, the power
amplifier, which requires a fixed DC power supply, and a cooling unit consume more
energy. However, the low power characteristics of small cells reduces this impact.
2.2 Heterogeneous Network Nodes
Macro Base Stations
Macro base stations are large cells providing the whole network coverage with powerful
Macro base stations deployed by an operator. Macrocell is the backbone in the
HetNet solution and provides a large coverage. Transmit power levels of macro base
stations typically varies between 5 W and 100 W [3].
7Micro Base Stations
Micro base stations are categorized under small cell base stations and gives coverage to
the micro cell with lower transmit power than macro base stations over the backhaul.
Micro base stations are regular base stations that are usually installed outdoors to fill
macro coverage gaps in dense spot areas such as train stations. Microcells configured
to operate in open access modes in which every subscriber can associate to the base
stations.
Pico Base Stations
Pico base station is typically used in indoor public areas and offer good capacity in
the range of tens of meters. It is difficult to distinguish Pico base stations, serving
picocells, precisely with micro base stations but they are of smaller sizes and lower
transmit power.
Femtocell Access Points
Femtocell access points are a small, low power access points designed to give coverage
of about 10-20 meters. Users perform the deployment and configuration of FAPs
at their own premises. Connectivity of femtocell access points with a core network
is through consumer’s own broadband connection (DSL or cable), which makes
deployment of femtocells simple. They offer a better broadband service for residential
users, small enterprises and good indoor network coverage. The deployment of
femtocell access points allows service providers and operators to alleviate indoor
mobile user problems and provide strengthened cellular signals. Hence, femtocells
play a significant role for indoor and cell-edge users data capacity improvement and
offloading macro cell.
2.3 Access modes
The use of access control mechanism in a cellular network supports various features of
small cells including interference management, flexible deployment, mobility support
and so on. It allows UEs to distinguish between femtocell and macro cell which
reduces battery consumption due to cell search. Small cells can be configured with
different access control methods.
There are three types of access control mechanisms where a base station or FAP
can be configured to [19]:
• closed access mode
• open access mode
• hybrid access mode
8Table 1: Types of base stations/ access points in Heterogeneous Networks [3].
Type Typical de-
ployments
power
level(Indoor)
Power
level(Outdoor)
# of Users Cell Range
Macro Urban areas,
Rural areas
- 20-100 W 200-1000
users
1Km to 100
Kms
Micro Urban areas - 5-10 W 100 - 200
users
Few hun-
dreds of
meters
Metro Urban areas - 10-20 W 100 - 200
users
Hundreds of
meters
Pico Public
areas In-
doors/Outdoor
100-250 mW 1-5 W 32-100 users Tens of
meters
Femto Residential,
enterprise
environ-
ments
10-100 mW 0.2-1 W Residential
Femto:4-8
users
Tens of me-
ters
Enterprise
Femto: 4-16
users
WiFi Residential,
enterprise
environ-
ments
20-100 mW 0.2-1 W <50 users Few tens of
meters
Closed access mode
In closed access mode only closed subscriber group (CSG) subscribers can get a
privileged access to the cell. A closed access configured cell also referred to as a CSG
cell. A closed access cell denies access to a UE which is not under its CSG list. The
concept of closed access subscriber group (CSG) defined in release 8 of 3GPP[20].
As an example, office and residential building small cells usually configured to closed
access modes. Thus, the small cell allows CSG access to the residents, their guests
and employees. Residential FAPS mainly operates on a closed subscriber group CSG.
Open access mode
An open access cell gives an access to all UEs equally. Open access cells are deployed
by a service provider to fill coverage holes. This type of access methods can be applied
for public areas like malls, airports, restaurants, etc. Femtocells configured to open
access mode to offload microcells and macrocells. Open access femtocell improves
network capacity but the negative issue is that it may lead to certain security risks.
9Hybrid access mode
A hybrid access cell provides access to all UEs that either belong to CSG or not. A
hybrid cell appears as a CSG cell for UEs under the CSG list and as a normal cell
for other users. A hybrid access femtocell allows access to both roamers and home
subscribers.
Figure 4 depicts a femtocells emplying with the three access control modes at
different locations.
Figure 4: Femtocell access control modes[4]
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2.4 Challenges of HetNets
The integration of small cells with macro cells creating a HetNet has a substantial
benefit over the homogeneous network. Some of the benefits are mentioned below:
• Small cells assist and offload macro cells data traffic and minimize macro cell
coverage holes.
• Enhances link quality by providing short transmitter-receiver distance.
• HetNet increases network coverage for hot spot and rural areas.
• Low power small nodes allows operators to minimize their power consumption.
• Improves spectral efficiency by using less coverage small cells, and so on.
Nonetheless, mass deployment of small cells introduces certain technical challenges
that needs to be solved properly to maximize the benefits of HetNet. Backhaul,
Mobility management, and interference are the main technical challenges that will
be discussed in the following:
2.4.1 Backhaul
Small cells backhaul is a connectivity link between the small cells and the MNO’s core
network. Backhaul provides connectivity to the core network and other network. In
case of Femtocells, it provides connectivity to the macro cell through the core network.
Comparing to macro cell backhaul, small cell backhaul becomes more challenging for
mobile operators. table1 provides a brief summary of small cell backhaul requirements.
There are some ways to provide small cells connectivity to the core network,
including wireless backhaul, using DSL, or fiber [21]. However, each of these methods
have advantages as well as drawbacks. In residential and small enterprise femtocells,
the backhaul connectivity is through the DSL/copper cable but this provides limited
data rates to end users. Another option is the use of fiber, which provides the highest
throughput and operators would like to apply it to their small cells. But this can
be expensive and is not a cost-effective solution for small cells. Wireless backhaul
for small cells, on the other hand, attracted a lot of attentions and many solutions
have emerged in recent years [22]. Applying wireless backhaul for indoor small cells
have a limitation of maintaining line of sight connectivity. There are some viable
options for small cell backhaul [23, 24, 25] yet it remains a challenge to conduct cost
effectively and without performance sacrification.
2.4.2 Mobility management
Handover and mobility management are essential to provide seamless connectivity
for mobile UEs[d]. Depending on where the handover intelligence resides, mobility
decisions can be a UE- or network-initiated. In LTE, a handover is typically triggered
11
Table 2: Small Cell Backhaul Requirements [8]
by base station [26].
Handover is a process of which a user is transferred from the serving cell to
another cell to maintain quality of service and ensure that a UE is connected to
the best serving cell [27]. Handovers triggered based on signal strength measure-
ments on the UE. In addition, handovers triggered for traffic load-balancing purpose
in which a UE connected to a highly congested cell can be handed to a less loaded cell.
Nevertheless, in heterogeneous network environments due to dense deployment
of different size small cells with different backhaul links handover management is
challenging. In [28] and [29] handovers between macro cell and femtocell have been
studied. The studies emphasize the challenges of optimizing handover with short-
range femtocells. The short range of femtocells leads to short stays and frequent
handover by UEs. Frequent handover comes at the expense of signaling overhead
at the system and increases probability of handover failures, which in turn result in
12
user outages.
Access control mode of small cells is another challenge for efficient mobility in
HetNet. The ability of CSG cells to deny access to non- CSG users prevents a UE
from connecting to the closest cell.
2.4.3 Interference in HetNets
Integration of small cells with macro cells alters the existing network topology, intro-
ducing a multi-layer also called multi-tier hierarchical cell network. This deployment
of small cells in the network, as discussed above, enhances capacity and network
coverage. However, the main technical challenge with the mass deployment of small
cell increases an interference. The interference takes place within and between tiers
and can be distinguished in two types: co-tier interference and cross-tier interference
[5].
Figure 5: Co-tier and Cross-tier Interference in a Heterogeneous network [5]
Co-tier Interference
Co-tier interference also known as co-layer interference refers to an interference which
takes place between cells belonging to same network layer. The interference caused
by a femtocell to neighbor femtocell users or interference caused by microcell to
adjacent microcell is an example of co-tier interference.
Cross-tier Interference
Cross-tier interference refers to the interference between base stations belonging to
different layers in the network. The downlink interference from femtocell FAP to
microcell and macrocell users or vice versa is a cross-tier interference.
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To realize the advantage of HetNet, the co-tier and cross-tier interference in a
network should be managed properly by applying different interference mitigation
techniques. In 3GPP LTE specification some features are added to mitigate in-
terference problem in HetNets. Some of the techniques are Inter-cell interference
coordination (ICIC), carrier aggregation with cross carrier scheduling and coordinated
multipoint (CoMP). One simple but expensive way to avoid cross-tier interference
between macrocell, microcell and femtocell is to assign a dedicated channel to femto-
cell subscribers. However, this approach reduces the spectral efficiency and expensive
regarding spectrum usage. Hence, sharing spectrum between microcell and femtocell
is an appropriate approach and a common trend to improve spectral efficiency.
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3 Spectrum Sharing
3.1 Introduction
Spectrum is a fundamental prerequisite for the success of wireless mobile communi-
cations. For over many years, static assignment of dedicated and exclusive licenses
has been the main approach that national regulatory authorities use to allocate
new spectrum bands. In exclusive access, only one operator has the right to use
and control the given range of frequency band. This static assignment guarantees
interference protection between frequency bands through licensing, allowing mobile
operators to assure high quality of service and reliability to the subscribers.
As the mobile data traffic growing fast, alongside the inexorable demand for
spectrum has placed pressure on mobile operators to ensure adequate capacity
performance and a need for greater flexibility of spectrum access. The traditional
static allocation often leads to a low spectrum utilization due to the reason that
operators’ spectrum demand may vary over time and location. Especially in small
cells networks with variable load and spectrum demand, exclusive access may result
inefficient spectrum utilization. The variation of demand, scarcity and low utilization
of spectrum has created a need for greater flexibility in addition to the current
licensed and unlicensed approach. Though exclusive access will be the dominant
strategy in mobile communications, spectrum sharing is an efficient regulatory option
for enabling high capacity, flexible usage and better Quality of Service.
Licensed 
Access(Dedicated)
Exclusive Access Light Licensing
Co-primary 
shared Access
Licensed Shared 
Access(LSA)
Unlicensed 
Shared Access
Unlicensed Primary 
Shared Access
License Exempt(Unlicensed 
Access)
Secondary Horizontal 
Shared Access
Figure 6: Spectrum access and authorization schemes [6]
Spectrum sharing refers to the collective use of a specific range of frequency by
multiple wireless systems. Spectrum sharing can be realized in several dimensions;
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time, space and geography. Spectrum sharing opens opportunities for mobile operator
to have access to currently underutilized spectrum and to meet the growing data rate
requirement of the current and future mobile communication market. A classification
of spectrum access modes and sharing scenarios are derived as shown in Figure 6.
3.2 Licensed Spectrum Access
In dedicated(licensed) access, National Regulatory Authority (NRA) grants a license
for using a spectrum to mobile network operators. The provided license would be
valid for a given frequency range, geographic area and for fixed time usually for a
decade. The following different spectrum access modes and sharing scenarios can be
defined under licensed or dedicated spectrum access: exclusive access, Light sensing,
Co-primary shared access, and Licensed shared access (LSA). Among the listed
licensed sharing scenarios, we will discuss co-primary shared access and license shared
access.
3.2.1 Licensed shared access
LSA is a spectrum access model in which licensees get access to a specific band usage
right from a primary license holder under certain rules and conditions defined by
the regulator. The LSA concept defined in [1] as “An individual licensed regime of a
limited number of licensees in a frequency band, already allocated to one or more
incumbent users, for which the additional users are allowed to use the spectrum (or
part of the spectrum) in accordance with sharing rules included in the rights of use
of spectrum granted to the licensees, thereby allowing all the licensees to provide
a certain level of QoS.”. As defined by ETSI, Figure 7 illustrates the LSA System
Architecture.
LSA scheme involves a regulator, the incumbent – the primary license holder, and
the LSA licensees - LSA spectrum usage license holders which shares the spectrum
with the incumbent on a basis of sharing agreement. For LSA licensees to get spectrum
access right from incumbents, they need to have the LSA spectrum usage license,
which would be granted by the regulator, and a sharing agreement. The framework
for LSA spectrum grant policy is formulated by national regulator authority. The
spectrum sharing activities between the incumbent and LSA licensees monitored
by the regulator. Providing a long-term sharing agreement between incumbent and
licensees, LSA guarantees investment security and Quality of Service at a given
frequency band, time period and geographic area. The main use case for LSA
technology relates to the extension of cellular capacity below 6GHz in Europe. For
the initial deployment of LSA in Europe, the 2.3-2.4 GHz has been identified.
3.2.2 Co-primary shared access
Co-primary shared access refers to a spectrum sharing, where multiple primary
license holders agree for a joint use of their licensed spectrum or fragment of it.
This co-primary sharing requires mutual agreements between spectrum holders and
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Figure 7: Licensed Shared Access System Architecture [7]
explicit priori usage policies (conditions) to define the common usage rules. In this
sharing model, there is no hierarchy of use and users have equal access rights with
no priorities. Co-primary shared access and related works are analyzed in detail in
the next section. The two co-primary shared access schemes are limited spectrum
pooling LSP and mutual renting MR.
Limited spectrum pooling
In Limited spectrum pooling (LSP), NRA grants a group license for several operators
that allow them to access a common pool of spectral resources. This group license
allows an operator to have equal access right on a shared basis with other known
authorized operators over the spectrum pool. This sharing scheme does not guarantee
a minimum amount of spectrum for immediate access, however the license holders
make a prior agreements that the individual operators has a predictable minimum
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value in the long-term share. It is envisioned that each operator owns exclusively
some piece of spectrum (primary component carriers) while there is also another
piece of spectrum to be shared among operators (secondary component carrier).
Mutual agreements allow operator with low traffic load using few secondary CCs for
satisfying their QoS while remaining carriers can be utilized by operators with high
traffic load.
Mutual Renting
In Mutual Renting (MR), licensed operators for an exclusive use of frequency bands
mutually allowed to rent parts of their licensed unused resources to their peers based
on prior requests. Instantly, an operator can rent resources from more than one
peer operators. For a given range of frequency, the actual owner has always a strict
priority.
3.2.3 Light Licensing
Light licensing access method is simpler and less expensive way of issuing spectrum
to users compared to the exclusive access method. In light licensing access mode,
operators/users are given the right to access bandwidth either with a very small
price compared to the fully exclusive allocation price or free, and they may be
required to follow usage terms and conditions set by NRA [30]. Light licensing access
provides a guarantee for better quality of service than unlicensed access and equal
sharing among license holders with a nominal cost. It is intended as a solution to
apply flexible spectrum allocation. However, there is a possible interference among
nearby licensees. In order to avoid or keep the interference at lower level, it requires
interference avoidance mechanisms.
3.3 License-Exempt Access
The unlicensed access allows several users to utilize the allocated frequency as a
common and shared resource without an individual license. It is unregulated approach
but sharing parties are subject to certain mandatory restrictions such as limited
transmitted power and fulfill required hardware configuration. Unlicensed spectrum
usage provides unpredictable QoS and system performance but the spectrum cost
is relatively low, typically zero. unlike licensed access there is no protection rights
for unlicensed bands. The best-known example of the unlicensed spectrum is indus-
trial, scientific, and medical radio (ISM) band at 2.4GHz. Multiple technologies are
used in unlicensed spectrum such as LTE unlicensed, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth. Under
unlicensed access, the following access modes and sharing schemes can be defined:
unlicensed shared access, unlicensed primary shared access and secondary horizontal
shared access.
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3.3.1 Unlicensed Shared Access
In unlicensed shared access, multiple users acquired an equal access to the license-
exempt frequency bands in which no priority service is assigned. In the unlicensed
shared access, guarantee for interference protection and quality of service is not
provided. To minimize the interference among nearby users, transmission over these
frequency bands subject to limited transmission power [31].
3.3.2 Secondary Horizontal Shared Access
Secondary horizontal shared access is the same as the unlicensed shared access except
that it provides a prioritized access to users. In this access, users with higher priority,
primary users, share the given frequency bands with unlicensed low priority users
called secondary users. Multiple unlicensed secondary users get the access in an
opportunistic manner with low access guarantee and protection from interference.
In horizontal shared access, there may be a requirement for secondary users to be
registered in a database, such as geolocation database, to get access to the shared
frequency bands [6].
3.3.3 Unlicensed Primary Shared Access
In unlicensed primary shared access, a primary service is allocated in a frequency
band and all services using the same technology can get access to these frequency
bands. A typical example of this access scheme is Digital European Cordless Telecom-
munications (DECT) operating in the 1880- 1900MHz band as a primary user through
mobile service allocation [6].
3.4 Game Theory For Spectrum Sharing
As is discussed in section 3, balancing the demand for wireless bandwidth with its
availability has become very challenging for mobile network operators. Because of
the inherent characteristic of wireless bandwidth being limited resource, the compe-
tition between service providers becomes severe. Service providers always tries to
maximize their user’s throughput and are selfish by nature. Therefore, the competing
interaction among these self-interested mobile operators sharing a common resource
can be modeled as a game. Using the game theoretical model, the outcome of the
interaction and the system performance of the operators can be predicted. Nowadays
game theory has been widely used in the area of mobile communication.
Game theory [14, 32, 33, 34] is a mathematical framework used to model and
predict possible outcomes of a cooperative or conflict (competing) strategic interaction
between multiple decision makers. The strategic interaction indicates that the decision
or action of one player affects the outcome of others. Game theory provides a set of
analytical tools to study or analyze the decision-making process when self-interested
players interact. Originally, game theory was invented in the field of economics and
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mathematics. But today, game theory becomes widely applied in different research
areas such as engineering, law, economics, and sociology.
3.4.1 Strategic Games
A game in a strategic form consists of three entities; a set of Players, set of strategies,
and utility function. A game involves a finite set of players P. A game with only one
player is called a decision problem. A set of strategies S which consists of strategies
of each player. Each player has a non-empty set of actions they select strategically
at each stage of a game. The utility function represents the outcome of the game for
each player with the selected strategy profile. strategy profile is a set of strategies
one for each player.
Definition
A strategic game mainly consists of three components:
• A set of players P = {1, 2, ..., N},
• A set of strategies S = {S1, S2, ..., SN}, in which each stratey Si consists of a
set of possible alternatives for player i. Where i ∈ N
• A utility function (also called as payoff function) Ui(S), which represents the
outcome of player i for choosing strategy S.
In a strategic game, the strategy represents one of the possible choices available
for each player. Thus, when player i participates in every distinguishable state of
the game it chooses one of the actions from the set Si. In game theory, there is a
generalized assumption that the players are rational. A rational player means that a
player selects a strategy which maximizes its payoff. Thus, game theory is used to
analyze and predict the interaction between these rational players.
For clear understanding of what a game between players represents, let us discuss
the best-known example of prisoner’s dilemma game.
Introductory example
The very common example used to explain a game theory is the prisoner’s dilemma.
The story tells about two suspects for committing a crime and put into a jail before
a trial. The prosecutor believes that they are guilty, but he could not get enough
evidence to send them to jail for what they did. The prosecutor offers the prisoners
a bargain with two choices to either confess or refuse. If one confesses and the other
does not, the one who refuse will sent to jail for 6 years, and the one who confess
will be free for his cooperation with the prosecutor. On the other hand, if they both
confess they will go to jail for 2 years each. However, if they both refuse to confess
the prosecutor has enough evidence to send them to prison for one year. Therefore,
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the prisoners have same two strategies: confess and refuse {C,R}. The prisoners are
in different cells, they do not have a means to communicate. Each of them has to
make their decision individually. However, the decision made by one prisoner affects
the other prisoner stay in prison. Their stay in prison is the result of both prisoners’
strategy choice. Now in this game, the players are the two prisoners and their payoff
is the number of years in prison. Players would like to maximize their payoff, which
is to have a minimum stay in prison. However, one player does not have a control
on the other one’s decision, which in turn affects its payoff. The matrix shows the
players strategies and their payoffs.
Player 2
Confess Refuse
Player 1 Confess (−2,−2) (0,−6)
Refuse (−6, 0) (−1,−1)
Table 3: The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
To predict what a player chooses to minimize its payoff at a prison lets observe
prisonner1 choices and the outcomes. Before making a decision player1 analyzes each
outcome assuming with the other players choice.
Supposes that player 2 betrays player1 and selects strategy confess to maximize
its payoff. Then, the optimal strategy for player1 will be to select strategy confess
since (C, C) has a better outcome than (C,R). In case players 2 stays faithful to his
friend and selects strategy refuse, player 2 will have two choices either to cooperate
or betray. Being faithful to his friend select strategy refuse and stay one year in
prison or betray his friendconfess and get free from jail. To be faithful to each other
and to select strategy refuse, they do not trust each other. Thus, each will try to
minimize their stay in prison.
Generally, the optimal choice for both prisoners is to select strategy confess. Thus,
it will be a reasonable prediction is to assume that both prisoners will confess.
3.4.2 Nash Equilibrium
In a game theory, Nash Equilibrium is a concept used to describe the steady state of
a game. Nash Equilibrium (NE) [34], also called strategic equilibrium, can be defined
as a strategy profile which no player maximizes its utility by unilaterally deviating
from this strategy profile. Thus, as long as the other player’s strategy remains the
same no player will change its strategy and get a better payoff.
In the above prisoner’s dilemma, for example, the strategy profile (C,C) is the
Nash Equilibrium of the game. Given the other prisoner strategy known to be
Confess, the only strategy for the other prisoner that maximizes its payoff is to
confess. Therefore, the strategy profile (C,C) will capture the steady state of the
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game and no player has an incentive to unilaterally change its strategy selection.
Definition: A strategic game G’s Nash equilibrium can defined as a strategy
profile (s∗i , s∗−i) , Where s∗i is player i’s strategy and the strategy of all other remaining
players denoted as s∗−i, such that:
Ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ Ui(si, s∗−i)
This holds true for all strategy si ∈ Si and every player i ∈ P . In other words,
for a strategy s∗i to be considered as a NE for any player i there must be no strategy
other than s∗i that yields a better utility, given that all other players strategy is s∗−i.
3.4.3 Cooperative/ Non-cooperative game
The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative game is the major division
branch in game theoretic approach [35].
In a cooperative game, the game participants are able to make a coalition and
act according to the binding agreement. So that for a player in a cooperative
game, selecting a strategy must abide the prior agreement. Whereas, in a non-
cooperative game each player acts independently in the absence of coalition and
without collaboration with others. Players in a non-cooperative game act rationally
and committed to their own strategies.
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4 Location-based Spectrum Sharing between Col-
located MNOs
Recently co-primary spectrum sharing gets many research work attentions. In many
researches, the interaction between operators modeled as a game where operators are
players with individual strategy of maximizing their own sum utility. In [36, 37] a
cooperative game model is studied for spectrum sharing, in which operators exchange
their operator specific information such as CSI. However, the exchange of operator
specific information between operators would result signaling overhead and requires
a link between operators. Since operators are competitive by nature, it is not wise
to design a cooperative game model.
A non-cooperative spectrum sharing game has been done in [38, 39, 40, 41]. In a
non-cooperative game, operators do not exchange any operator specific information
and make decisions independently. Among these works, the main motivation for this
thesis is [42]. In [42] the authors proposed a non-cooperative repeated spectrum-
sharing model. The interaction between operators is based on history of their utility
gain/loss. The idea is that when an operator experiences a high inter-operator
interference on the shared part of the spectrum pool, the operator will ask for a
spectrum usage favor. The spectrum usage favor is exchanged when one operator
requests for favor and the other operator accept the request and give permission.
The exchange of the usage favor results a utility gain for an operator and utility loss
for the other. For an operator, giving a favor is losing the right to use the given part
of the spectrum for some time. However, operators participate in the game willingly.
In our approach, we follow exactly the same coordination mechanism as [42]
but for a fair regulation of the common spectral pool, we proposed location based
spectrum exchange. We assumed that operators subdivide their common operational
area into small areas, in which clusters of BSs exist. Operators exchange a small or a
big favor. A big favor is exchange only at the worst case, where there is a huge inter-
operator interference or an operator experiences a heavy load. By proposing an option
for a small favor, we are able to minimize the utility loss of an operator. At a given
instant of time when an operator gives a small favor the operator can still have the
right to use the common pool in sub areas where the inter-operator interference is low.
The aim of this study is to show how operators coordinate to minimize inter-
operator interference and benefit from the joint usage of a spectrum. We show that
for operators getting an option of small or big favor enables them to improve user
rate and minimize the excess utility loss.
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4.1 System Model
We considered a downlink co-primary spectrum sharing between HetNet MNOs. The
MNOs comprises a microcell and femtocells. Each operator has a licensed frequency
band composed of P component carriers (CCs). The micro cells can transmit over
all P CCs, Microcells of each operators share their spectrum orthogonally. The
operators mutually agree to use their spectrum jointly for efficiently utilize the
available resource. For the construction of the common spectrum pool, each operator
contributes equal number of CCs. Femto access points of each operator are then
allowed to transmit over the common pool whereas, the micro base stations share
their frequency orthogonally. Fig.8 shows the spectrum allocation for micro and
Femto cells as well as the common spectrum pool for the case of two operators. For
simplicity, we consider two operators participating in our spectrum-sharing model,
but it can be expanded to number of operators.
Figure 8: Spectrum allocation between femtocell and microcell and construction of a
common spectrum pool for femtocell of operator 1 and operator 2.
Due to the common utilization of the spectrum pool, inter-operator interference
exists between the operators (OP1 and OP2). Over the 2q CCs the Femto-connected
users (FUE) suffer from Femto to Femto inter-operator co-tier interference. Femto
access points (FAP) of OP1 generate inter-operator cross-tier interference to micro-
connected users (MUE) of OP2 over (2q ∩ P ) CCs. Also, FAP of OP2 will generate
cross-tier inter-operator interference to MUE of OP1 over (2q ∩ P ) CCs.
To minimize the inter-operator interference and to benefit from spectrum sharing,
a coordination between femtocells and microcells of the operators is expected. For
this purpose, the operators agree on prior rules for the regulation of the spectrum
pool usage. Based on interference profile and traffic load, operators ask each other a
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spectrum usage favor for exclusive use of some CCs of the common pool. The spec-
trum usage favor refers to, when one operator asks the other operator to discontinue
its transmission over some of the component carriers of the common spectral pool
for some time [42]. In our approach, to avoid the co-tier and cross-tier inter-operator
interference the microcell and femtocell of an operator can ask a spectrum usage
favor from femtocell of the other operator. It is possible for both operators to request
and grant a spectrum usage favor at the same time and the utilization of the common
pool may even become orthogonal. An operator can ask a spectrum usage favor for
a maximum of the number CCs it provides to the common pool.
Our model follows the same coordination mechanism as [42] but for the fair
regulation of the common spectral pool we introduced a more localized spectrum
sharing option of ‘small’ and ‘big’ favor. For this purpose, the common coverage
area divided into smaller subareas. Each subarea contains a number of base stations
of both operators. The subareas known commonly by the operators as A1, A2..., An.
The dimension of each subarea agreed at priori between the operators.
A small favor represents a favor from FAPs in one of the subareas whereas, big
favor constituents all FAPs in all subareas. The mutually agreed spectrum sharing
rules between the operators includes the decision-making mechanism rules, favor va-
lidity time, dimension of subareas, and the default state. The default state represents
the state at which both operators’ femtocells are utilizing the common pool. When
an operator granted a favor, the exchanged favor is valid for the certain interval
of time called, favor validity time. Favor validity time is fixed and in the range of
seconds. As the granted favor entails to exit from the default state, the expiration of
the favor validity time returns the usage of the common pool to the default state.
In the considered repeated game, the interaction between the operators is based
on book keeping of the exchange of favors. At a given stage of the game, an operator
is willing to give a spectrum usage favor if and only if the other operator is going
to pay it back with equal amount of favor in the future. Since the repeated game
encounters a large set of equilibrium points, it is hard to find and analyze its unique
NE point. Therefore, we follow heuristic threshold based strategies [42] to obtain
long-term reciprocity. The threshold value keeps monitoring the exchange of favors
between the operators. Therefore, the decision-making procedure depends not only
on the result at a given stage game, but also in the history of previous reward
exchanges.
4.2 Location based spectrum sharing mechanism
Initially the usage of the common spectrum pool is at the default state. At the
given state, to determine whether to request or grant a favor, an operator needs to
estimate the utility gain/ loss of its own for asking/ granting a favor respectively.
The utility represents the satisfaction of users for the services offered by the serving
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operators. The system architecture for the co-primary spectrum sharing is shown in
Figure 9. To calculate the utility gain/ loss, an operator needs to identify the level of
the inter-operator interference. For the estimation of the interference level from the
other operator network, one operator may request its UEs to make a measurement
of the interference from the other operator and report to the serving base station.
Normally a UE is able measure the signal strength and quality of the neighbor cells
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Figure 9: System architecture for co-primary spectrum sharing between mobile
network operators
of own operator network through reference signals for cell selection/reselection and
handover purposes [43]. With the same procedure, we assumed that it is feasible
for a UE to measure the total interference from the other operator network. The
UE then reports the total inter-operator interference to the serving base station.
Upon receiving the total inter-operator interference from all UEs in its cell range, a
small cell can estimate the impact of the inter-operator interference. Aggregating
the received reports, a base station/ FAP will send it to the spectrum controller.
Once this information is retrieved, the spectrum controller sums up the aggregated
small cells report in each sub areas and sorts the sub areas based on the impact
from the inter-operator interference. The spectrum controller selects a sub area with
highest interference from other operator networks. In case the level of inter-operator
interference in all subareas is almost the same, then the spectrum controller of
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operator O selects the total area to make favor request from opponent operator to
stop using some of the q ccs it contributes to the common pool. Once the area is
selected, the spectrum controller evaluates its network utility gain/ loss of a presumed
favor comparing with its utility in the default state.
To make a decision whether to grant or request a favor the operator (OP1) then
compares its instantaneous utility gain of the current stage game with the threshold
values. In case the instantaneous utility gain is greater than the threshold value
(expected utility loss) for the given component carrier, then OP1 will ask a favor
from OP2. An Operator always attempts to ask the maximum number of component
carriers, so that its instantaneous utility gain will be greater than the corresponding
threshold. OP2 then accepts the spectrum usage favor request if its immediate
utility loss for giving the required spectrum usage favor on the given CC is less than
the expected utility gain (threshold value). Then OP1 and OP2 will update their
corresponding threshold values.
4.2.1 Algorithm
The algorithm for operator O ∈ {OP1, OP2} to ask or grant a favor on i CCs in the
form of pseudocode is below:
Algorithm 1 Co-Primary Spectrum Sharing
1: procedure Ask Favor(Operator O selects area A ∈ {Axor∑nx=1Ax}to ask a
favor on i CCs for i = 1, 2, ..., q)
2: Step 1 Operator O
Calculate utility gain for the presumed favor
U gainO,i = U
hyp
O,i − UdefaultO,i
Compare U gainO,i with the respective threshold value:
3: if U gainO,i > θO,i then
4: SO =ask a favor on i-ccs . SO–Operator O strategy
5: else
6: i = i− 1,
7: go to 2
8: end if
9: end procedure
10: procedure GRANT Favor(Upon being asked to give a favor on i CCs i = 1,
2, ..., q)
11: Step 1 Operator O
Calculate utility loss for the required favor
U lossO,i = U
default
O,i − UhypO,i
Compare U lossO,i with corresponding threshold value:
12: if U lossO,i < λO,i then
13: SO = Grant a favor on i- CCS
14: end if
15: end procedure
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4.3 Model of Wireless Network
Suppose the common area, A, shared by two operators OP1 and OP2 is divided into
n subareas A = {A1, A2...An}. The FAPs of operator O ∈ {OP1, OP2} installed
in subarea Ax gives a service for nAx number of users. The micro base station of
operator O gives coverage for nM users.
The downlink signal to interference plus noise ratio SINR of the n-th users of
operator O on the i-th CC can be defined as:
SINRn,i =
βO,iSO,n,i
IN + βO,iIO,n,i + β−O,iI−O,n,i
(1)
During orthogonal sharing of spectrum between the operators, the SINR is:
SINRn,i =
βO,iSO,n,i
IN + βO,iIO,n,i
. (2)
Note I−O,n,i = 0 where SO,n,i is the downlink received signal power, IN is the noise
power, and IO,n,i and I−O,n,i, respectively represents the intra- and inter-operator
interference on the i-th cc. In the above expressions, the allocation indicator beta
(β) indicates whether operator O is using the i-th CC. At the default state, both
operators are utilizing the spectral pool, βO = 1 and β−O = 1, whereas in case of
favor exchange if the femtocells of operator O stops using the i-th CC βO = 0 .
For the n-th UE of operator O the transmission rate on the i-th cc can be
calculated as:
Rn,i = wn,iBWi log2(1 + SINRn,i) (3)
where BW is bandwidth of CC and wn,i is the time scheduling weight of the n-th
user on the i-th CC.
4.3.1 Utility Function
Initially the operators are at the default state, where both operators’ femtocells utilize
the common spectral pool. Therefore, at each stage game operators first calculate the
network utility at the default state. We assumed both operators use a proportionally
fair utility function. The logarithmic proportional utility function maximizes the
overall utility of user rates by providing a compromise between user fairness and
maximum throughput [44]. The network utility of operator O, UO defined as:
UO =
nA1∑
n=1
log
 2q∑
i=1
Rn,i
+nA2∑
n=1
log
 2q∑
i=1
Rn,i
+...+nAn∑
n=1
log
 2q∑
i=1
Rn,i
+nM∑
n=1
log
( p∑
i=1
Rn,i
)
(4)
UO = UO,A1 + UO,A2 + ...+ UO,An + UO,M
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The utility function of operator O Equation 4 is a function of βO and β−O through
Equation 1 and Equation 3:
UO = UO (βO, β−O)
Thus the utility function of operator O at the subarea Ax :
UO,Ax = UO,Ax (βO,Ax, β−O,Ax) (5)
At the default state both operator are transmitting over the 2q CCs, thus β2qO = 1
and β2q−O = 1 where β2q = (β1, β2, ..., β2q)
4.3.2 Area Selection
This option of area selection is made for a more localized spectrum sharing mech-
anism, where operators agree and select subareas to avoid the interference from
nearest base stations and the interference from other sub area base stations assumed
to be negligible.
As we have discussed in subsection 4.2, the operator selects a subarea or the
total shared area to make a favor request. Thus, the interference level at each area
is compared with the interference level over the total area. The interference level
over the total shared area IA can be calculated as:
IA = IA1 + IA2 + ...+ IAn (6)
Where IAx is the interference at each sub area Ax. The interference over subarea
Ax summed up as:
IAx =
m∑
i=1
Ii (7)
Where Ii the interference report from users served by base station i, and m is the
number of base stations housed in subarea Ax. Then to select the subarea with the
highest interference level the sum interference at each subarea will be compared to
the total area sum interference. If IAx > µIA, where µ is set as a selection coefficient.
For example, if µ = 0.6, then a sub area which contains 60% of the total interference
from the other operator is selected. After the selection if the utility gain for the
assumed favor is much less than the case where the total area is selected, then other
sub area will be considered to make a favor request.
4.3.3 Small Favor
Based on the measurement report from its UEs, let us assume that operator O
selects subarea Ax to ask a favor from operator -O to stop using q CCs from the
common pool. Then operator O estimates its utility gain taking an assumption that
Operator O’s FAPs in the selected subarea Ax stops transmitting over these CCs and
the interference coming from the neighboring subarea FAPs are considered negligible.
Thus, the assignment indicator of operator -O for subarea Ax will be zero over the
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given CCs. The immediate utility gain of operator O for the assumed small favor
over q CCs can be calculated as:
U gainO = U
hyp
O − UdefaultO (8)
U gainO = U
hyp
O (βO, β−O)− UdefaultO (βO, β−O) (9)
At the hypothetical state, the assignment indicator for Operator -O:
β2q−O = β
2q
−O,Ai = 1,
Where i = 1, 2, ..., n and i 6= x
For i = x the assignment indicator can be re-written as β2q−O =
(
βq−O, β
2q−q
−O
)
, where
βq−O = (β−O,1, ..., β−O,q) and β2q = (β−O,q+1, ..., β−O,2q). Thus, the assignment indica-
tor of Operator -O for the subarea Ax is β−O,Ax = (0q, 12q−q).
Deducting Equation 8 the utility gain of operator O at the given stage of game
for getting a small favor from operator -O in the q-th cc on the subarea Ax can be
estimated as:
U gainO = UO,Ax
(
12q,
(
0q, 12q−q
))
− UO,Ax
(
12q, 12q
)
(10)
Each operator selects a strategy to maximize its utility, but at a single stage of a
game, an operator may experience a loss for granting a favor. However, an operator
will get the favor back in return in the near future. Upon being asked, Operator -O
estimates its utility loss for the required favor over the subarea Ax before granting a
favor:
U loss−O = U−O,Ax
(
12q, 12q
)
− U−O,Ax
((
0q, 12q−q
)
, 12q
)
(11)
4.3.4 Big Favor
An operator considers a big favor when the interference from opponent operator
affects its utility over all the area shared by both operator. In such a case, an operator
selects the whole area to request for a favor. Let us assume operator O selects the
given common shared area A, to ask a favor from operator -O over q CCs. The utility
gain of operator O estimated, taking in assumption that the FAPs of Operator -O
installed over the shared area stops using q CCs of the common pool. Thus, the
utility gain can be estimated from Equation 8 and the assignment indicator of for
operator -O at the hypothetical state assumed to be:
β2q−O = β
2q
−O,Ai = 1,
for all i=1,2,...,n.
Therefore, the utility gain of Operator O for getting a big favor from Operator -O
over q CCs estimated as:
U gainO = UO(12q, (0q, 12q−q))− UO(12q, 12q) (12)
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Similarly, operator -O estimates its utility loss for the required big favor:
U loss−O = U−O(12q, 12q)− U−O((0q, 12q−q), 12q) (13)
One can observe from the above equations the difference between a small favor gain/
loss and a big favor gain/loss is that, the change in the utility for small favor is only
over the area selected for a given favor. Whereas for a big favor the gain/loss of the
operator’s utility calculated over all the shared area.
4.4 Non-localized Spectrum sharing
The location-based spectrum sharing in subsection 4.2 discusses a localized spectrum
sharing between two operators in common coverage area. By classifying the shared
area into subareas, we introduce a more-localized spectrum sharing between the
operators. Let us consider a common geographic area which encompasses N multiple
independent set of coverage areas such as buildings. The term independent used to
mean that, the transmission in one building do not interfere with the transmission
in the other building. Thus, in a given common geographic area the operators play
N-stage repeated location-based spectrum sharing game, where a single stage game
refers to a game in one building.
The non-localized spectrum sharing involves operators in a single stage game over
the total geographic area instead of localized game into buildings or more-localized
game to smaller areas. Now consider a single stage game where the operators Op1
and OP2 exchange spectrum sharing favors based on the network load or interfer-
ence profile over the total coverage area. Each operator asks or grants a favor on i,
i=1,2,...,q CCs. Unlike location-based spectrum sharing, in Non-localized spectrum
sharing the exchange of favor affects the user’s throughput over all the geographic
area. When operator Op1 grants a favor of i CCs for operator Op2, all base stations
of operator Op1 stops transmitting over the i-th CCs.
For an operator O, to ask/ grant a favor it estimates its utility gain/ favor in each
building and takes the summation. For N buildings in a given common geographic
area, the total utility gain for operator O for getting a spectrum favor over i CCs
estimated as:
U gainO,i =
N∑
j=1
(
U gainO,i,j
)
(14)
Where j = 1, 2, ..., N and U gainO,i,j is the utility gain of operator O in the localized
area j and can be estimated using Equation 12. Similarly, the utility loss of operator O
for granting a favor of i CCs estimated as:
U lossO,i =
N∑
j=1
(
U lossO,i,j
)
(15)
Where j = 1, 2, ..., N and U lossO,i,j is the utility loss of operator O for granting i
CCs favor over localized area j from Equation 13.
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In Non-localized single stage spectrum sharing game, both operators utilize the
common spectral pool at the default stage. In a single stage game, the operator’s
utility loss/ gain depends on the strategic decision made by each operator at this
stage of the game. The available set of strategies for each operator are: ask a favor,
grant a favor or do nothing. To maximize their utility, it is clear that both operators
will ask a favor and never grant a favor. Therefore, the equilibrium solution for this
single stage game is for both operator to ask a favor. However, since both operators
never grant a favor, both operators utilizing the common spectral pool is the logical
decision.
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5 Numerical Results
MATLAB-generated simulation results are discussed in this chapter. The perfor-
mance of the obtained results with the localized and non-localized spectrum sharing
mechanism is evaluated and compared to the orthogonal spectrum sharing scheme.
In addition, the localized per half-building spectrum sharing with free selection of
small or big favor analyzed in comparison to the localized per building spectrum
sharing scheme.
5.1 Simulation Scenario and Parameters
The system under consideration as discussed in previous chapter consists of two
HetNet MNOs participating in the spectrum sharing simulation.
The simulation environment considers the example deployment of Figure 10,
assumed to have 400 buildings laid out in Manhattan-like grid model. The dimension
of each building covers 100 m x 100 m and inter building distance of 30 m. Each
building allocates to both operators. In each building we consider the deployment of
Figure 11, comprising five indoor Femto access points (FAP) per operator. The micro
base stations of both operators deployed outside of the building to give coverage
to the outdoor users as well as some indoor users. The indoor installed FAPs give
coverage to indoor UEs and assist microcells of the operator. The given UE selects
the serving base station of home network based on the strongest reference signal
received power.
For the localized per building spectrum sharing, each building is considered for
each single stage game. For the localized per half building, the area of a building is
divided into two sub areas A = (A1, A2). Both operators know the sub areas at priori
as area1 (A1) and area2 (A2), in which the exchange of favors in these subareas
referred to us a small favor. Subarea A1 covers for 50 m x 50 m left half of the
building whereas; subarea A2 covers right half of the area. Layout of the simulation
scenario is shown in Figure 11 and Figure 10.
For the indoor and outdoor signal propagation, we consider a simple power-law
distance based propagation path loss model at a carrier frequency of 2.6 GHz. We
assumed modern buildings with external thick wall, hence due high wall attenua-
tion the interference from indoor FAPs to outdoor users assumed to be negligible.
However, the micro cell transmission interferes the indoor Femto-connected users
received signal. For outdoor-to-indoor propagation, we use 17dB wall attenuation.
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Figure 10: Multi building simulation environment.
100 m
100 m
30 m
pathway
A2 = 50 m x 100 m
A1 = 50 m x 100 m
Micro Base station
Femto Access Point
Figure 11: Micro base station and FAPs deployment scenario
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Each operators’ licensed frequency bandwidth of 30 MHz is divided into 3 equal
CCs of 10 MHz each BWc = 10 MHz. The outdoor deployed Micro base station
of each operator can transmit their signal over 3 CCs of own operator’s license
with the available power budget of 30 dBm per CC. During orthogonal spectrum
sharing, FAPs of the operators can use only two CCs of own operator license to serve
femto-connected UEs, see also Figure 8.
Table 4: Simulation Parameters
Number of Operators 2
Number of FAPs/operator 5/building
Number of Micro BSs/operator 1/building
Number of Indoor and Outdoor UEs Poisson distributed with mean Ni per
operator per the shared geographical
area
Carrier Frequency 2.6 GHz
Total Bandwidth/operator 30 MHz
Number of Component Carri-
ers/operator
3
Spectrum pool size 4 Component carriers
Carrier Bandwidth 10 MHz
Transmission power in Femtocell 20 dBm
Transmission Power in Microcell 30 dBm
Scheduler Proportional fair
Number of buildings 400
Inter-building distance 30 m
Building dimension 100m× 100m
Indoor Layout Single Story
Number of Sub Areas 2
Sub Area dimension 50m× 50m
Path loss model power law distance based path loss
Cd−A
Path loss exponent A = 3.7
Attenuation Constant C = 8.435× 10−5
Wall Attenuation 17dB
For the construction of the common spectral pool, both operators contribute
2CCs of the femtocells, providing a total size of a pool 4CCs. Thus, as discussed in
previous chapter, the FAPs can access the common pool simultaneously with the
available power budget of 20 dBm per 10 MHZ at default state. However, due to
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the coexistence of the operators, micro-connected UEs experience an interference
from FAPs of the opponent operator from half of the spectral pool. In addition,
Femto-connected UEs experiences Femto-to-Femto interference. Details of simulation
parameters are given in Table 4.
5.2 Spectrum Sharing Schemes Performance Evaluation
Before investigating the actual simulation results, let us first observe allocation of
the common pool for localized per half building spectrum sharing case when one
operator asks and the other grants a favor. Assume operator OP1 requests a favor
over subarea A2 to get an exclusive use of 2ccs the common pool. OP2 has two
FAPs on subarea A2 and 3FAPs on sub area A1. When OP2 grants the required
favor, FAPs of OP2 installed on sub area A2 stops using 2 CCs from the common
pool. At the given stage game, as shown in Figure 12, FAP1 and FAP2 of OP2 can
use only 2CCs of own operator. The rest FAPs of OP2 and all FAPs of OP1 share
the spectrum pool simultaneously. After the expiration of favor exchange valid time,
utilization of the common pool returns to default state.
Figure 12: An example where Operator 2 turned off its femto1 and femto2 in the
selected area from the common pool due to the granted favor for Operator1.
5.2.1 User Distribution
During the simulation, the number of users follow Poisson distribution with mean
NOP1 for Operator 1 and NOP2 for Operator 2. We observe two scenarios where
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the operators have equal and unequal mean number of users for the given whole
area of 400 buildings. For the first considered scenario when the operators have
symmetric mean network load, we take a mean number of users for both operators
NOP1 = NOP2 = 800. In the second scenario, the simulation carried out with the
operators having asymmetric mean number of users in the shared area. For this case
we set NOP1 = 800 and NOP2 = 1200.
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, with spectrum sharing game, an
operator can get a spectrum usage favor from lightly loaded operator and improve its
performance. On the other hand, less loaded operator deteriorates its user throughput
for giving a favor for the other operator. In case of asymmetric mean number of
users between operators, thus a load reversal considered to balance the exchanged
number of favors between the operators. In the first 200 rounds of the simulation,
we set the mean load for operator OP1 is 1200 and 800 for operator OP2. Then for
the latter half of the simulation, the mean load for operator OP1 is 800 and 1200 for
operator OP2.
5.2.2 Simulation Results
The performance of localized and non-localized spectrum sharing mechanisms evalu-
ated in the Manhattan-like grid model of 20 x 20 buildings. Users distribute inside
and outside of the buildings according to the used distribution model discussed in
subsubsection 5.2.1. The assumed repeated spectrum sharing game between the
operators (OP1 and OP2) performed in a 400-stage game, where a single stage game
represents an exchange of favor in one building. Operators’ load and inter-operator
interference varies in each building. The gain/ loss of each operator recorded in each
building and the threshold values updated in each round. Thus, the gain/loss of
an operator at one building affects the decision of the operator at the next build-
ing. Initially the threshold values are set arbitrarily equal to λO,1 = λO,2 = 1 and
θO,1 = θO,2 = 1.
Simulation results are presented in terms of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the throughputs obtained in all the spectrum-sharing scenarios, generated
according to the aforementioned parameters. The user rate CDFs are plotted for op-
erators OP1 and OP2 with respective symmetric and asymmetric Poisson distributed
mean number of users.
The simulation results depict the following spectrum sharing scenarios:
• Orthogonal spectrum sharing (Orthogonal-SS): The operators utilize
their own spectrum orthogonally.
• Non-Localized spectrum sharing (Non-Localized-SS):The sharing of
the common spectrum pool agreed at the total geographic area level thus, both
operators utilize the common spectrum pool jointly over the shared area.
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• Localized per building spectrum sharing (LocalizedBuilding-SS): The
operators agree exchange of spectrum favor per building level i.e. operators
exchange always a big favor.
• Localized per half-building spectrum sharing (LocalizedHalfBuilding-
SS): The exchange of spectrum usage favor is agreed per half building. The
spectrum sharing favor consists an option of either small or big favor.
Figure 13: User rate distribution of Operator 1 for symmetric mean loads.
In Figure 13 and Figure 14, the simulation results for Operator 1 and Operator 2
with orthogonal, non-localized, localized per building, and localized per half-building
spectrum sharing mechanisms are depicted. The results for the considered spectrum
sharing mechanisms are obtained in a situation where the operators have equal
mean number of users, NOP1 = NOP2 = 800, in the shared geographical area. The
simulation results in Figure 13 and Figure 14 are tabulated with the user rate at
the 5th percentile and mean throughput variables for all the considered spectrum
sharing scenarios in Table 5.
The results for Operator 1 and Operator 2 with the non-localized, localized
per building, and localized per half-building spectrum sharing shows a significant
improvement compared to the results of orthogonal spectrum sharing. In Figure 13,
the non-localized spectrum sharing in comparison to the orthogonal static allocation,
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Figure 14: User rate distribution of Operator 2 for symmetric mean loads.
Table 5: Mean throughput and 5th percentile user rate for symmetric mean loads
Sharing Mechanism Mean throughput[Mbps] User rate at the
5% of the CDF
[Mbps]
Operator 1
Orthogonal-SS 111.47 23.00
NonLocalized-SS 140.65 2.94
Localized per Building-SS 135.83 20.54
Localized per halfBuilding-SS 139.83 21.31
Operator 2
Orthogonal-SS 114.32 20.80
NonLocalized-SS 146.59 1.49
Localized per Building-SS 144.94 20.14
Localized per halfBuilding-SS 148.52 18.00
delivers an improvement to the user rate distribution. Nonetheless, for 50 percent of
the users the non-localized spectrum sharing introduces a significant loss, while the
remaining 50 percent of users can benefit from the sharing mechanism. At the 5th
39
percentile user throughput decreases from 23 Mbps to 3 Mbps when compared to the
orthogonal spectrum sharing. With the non-localized spectrum sharing mechanism,
50 percent of users can achieve throughput above 120 Mbps.
Similar patterns are captured for Operator 2 in Figure 14. The result showed
that around 54 percent of Operator 2 users’ rate deteriorates with non-localized
spectrum sharing, while the rest 46 percent users achieve a significant gain. At the
5th percentile Operator 2 users’ throughput decreases from 20 Mbps to 1.5 Mbps
when compared to the orthogonal spectrum sharing. This user rate deterioration in
the non-localized spectrum sharing happens due to the inter-operator interference
when the operators access the spectrum pool jointly. For the users located close to
interference sources orthogonal utilization of spectrum yields a better throughput.
On the other hand, from the localized per building and per half-building spectrum
sharing, almost all users of both operators enjoy a better data rate. At the fifth per-
centile, users attain almost equal throughput as of the orthogonal spectrum sharing
mechanism. With localized per building and localized per half-building spectrum
sharing mechanisms, 95 percent of users of both operators achieve a throughput of
above 20 Mbps and 18 Mbps respectively.
Users’ data rate distribution with the localized per building and localized per half
building spectrum-sharing shows a minor dissimilarity of approximately 1-2 percent
difference. This is due to the fact that, for users located near their serving base
stations the localized per half building refines the closest interferences and results
a better data rate. In case of localized per building spectrum sharing, it gives a
better data rate for users located close to interferences and far from their serving
base station. Thus, averaged over the total area the localized per building and
localized per half-building spectrum sharing results almost the same performance
improvement to the operators. Overall, from the simulation results we observed that
the non-localized spectrum sharing introduces more performance loss to operators’
user rate compared to the localized spectrum sharing.
In Figure 15, the exchange of favors between the operators for the localized per
building and localized per half building spectrum sharing is depicted. During the
localized spectrum sharing per building, Operator 1 receives exclusive access to the
spectrum pool (part of it) for 41 percent of the buildings and it grants an exclusive
access of the spectrum pool for 42 percent of the buildings for Operator 2. In the
localized per half building spectrum sharing, the exchanged favor can be either for the
half building or for the whole building. As the operators exchange more number of
small favors the negligible difference in users’ rate that we observed in Figure 13 and
Figure 14 with the localized per building and localized per half-building spectrum
sharing will become siginificant. In 17 percent of the buildings both operators utilize
the spectrum pool jointly this is due to the fact that the operators have equal mean
number of users.
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Figure 15: Share of different favors for Operator 1 and Operator 2 with symetric
mean load case
In localized per half-building spectrum sharing case, the operators minimize their
utility loss by favoring spectrum for the half of the building and maximize their
utility gain by asking a spectrum usage favor over the building. On the other hand,
in the localized per building spectrum-sharing case, the operators can ask and grant
a spectrum usage favor for the whole building which maximizes their utility gain and
utility loss as well. This characteristics is captured in 16(a) and 16(a). 16(a) and
16(a) shows the excess utility loss and gain of Operator 1 and Operator 2 for the
localized per building and localized per half building spectrum sharing mechanisms
with the exchange of 1 and 2 CCs. In case of localized per half building spectrum
sharing, the more operators exchange a small favor the more the operators minimize
their utility loss.
Next comes the second simulation scenario for the case when the operators have
asymmetric mean number of users over the given shared geographical area. Figure 17
and Figure 18 shows the simulation results for Operator 1 and Operator 2 with
orthogonal, non-localized, localized per building, and localized per half-building
spectrum sharing mechanisms. The results obtained for Operator 1 and Operator 2
with mean number of users Nop1=800 and Nop2=1200 in the first half of the
simulation and Nop1=1200 and Nop2=800 in the last 200 rounds of the simulation.
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(a) Operator 1 Excess utility
(b) Operator 2 Excess utility
Figure 16: Excess utility loss and gain of Operator 1 and Operator 2 with 1 and 2
CCs and symmetric mean load between the operators
The users rate at the 5th percentile and the mean throughput for both operators
with all the considered spectrum sharing scenarios tabulated as shown in Table 6.
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Figure 17: User rate distribution of Operator 1 for asymmetric mean load scenario.
Figure 18: User rate distribution of Operator 2 for asymmetric mean load scenario.
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Table 6: Mean throughput and 5th percentile user rate for asymmetric mean load
scenario
Sharing Mechanism Mean throughput[Mbps] User rate at the
5% of the CDF
[Mbps]
Operator 1
Orthogonal-SS 96.11 15.15
NonLocalized-SS 120.36 1.07
Localized per Building-SS 119.88 20.57
Localized per halfBuilding-SS 121.33 19.50
Operator 2
Orthogonal-SS 98.84 15.79
NonLocalized-SS 126.26 0.72
Localized per Building-SS 119.36 16.33
Localized per halfBuilding-SS 125.78 15.97
From Figure 17 and Figure 18, one can observe that the considered spectrum
sharing mechanisms provide a better user rate for both operators. In Figure 17,
when compared to orthogonal spectrum sharing results, 50 percent of Operator 1
users experience a lower throughput from the non-localized spectrum sharing scheme.
However, it is shown clearly that the rest 50 percent of the users achieve 15 to
52 percent performance gain compared to the orthogonal spectrum sharing results.
Users rate at the 5th percentile shows that non-localized spectrum sharing results 5
percent of users receive a user rate of less than 1 Mbps and the rest 95 percent of
the users receive a throughput of grater that 1Mbps.
Similarly, from the non-localized spectrum sharing scheme, about 45 percent
of Operator 2 users faces a considerable performance loss when compared to the
orthogonal spectrum sharing. It is depicted in Figure 18 that the rest 55 percent of
users achieve 20 to 46 percent performance gain from the non-localized spectrum
sharing scheme. At the worst-case, 5 percent of users will get a throughput of less
than 1 Mbps, whereas the rest 95 percent users achieve a user rate of greater than
1 Mbps. This loss to user rate in the non-localized spectrum sharing is due to
the inter-operator interference introduced to each other because of the operators
accessing the spectrum pool simultaneously. Even though this spectrum sharing
scheme provides a better performance for about 50 percent of users, the user rate
deterioration for the rest 50 percent of users is an acceptable.
It is showed in Figure 17 and Figure 18 that from the localized per building
and localized per half building spectrum sharing mechanism both operators achieve
a better user throughput. From the localized per building and localized per half
building spectrum sharing, Operator 1 users achieve 15 to 50 percent improved user
44
Figure 19: Share of different favors for Operator 1 and Operator 2 with asymmetric
mean load case
rate when compared to the orthogonal spectrum sharing mechanism. Likewise, Oper-
ator 2 users obtain 5 to 45 percent improved user rate. The results from the localized
per building and localized per half building show a minor dissimilarity due to users’
location and the number of small and big spectrum usage favor between the operators.
In Figure 19, the shared percentage of favors between Operator 1 and operator 2
during the localized spectrum sharing scheme is depicted. Out of the 400 buildings in
the simulation environment, Operator 1 receives a spectrum usage favor for 42 percent
of the buildings and Operator 2 receives a spectrum usage favor for 42 percent of the
buildings as well. The rest 16 percent of the buildings the operators either have equal
number of users or estimate high utility loss to grant a favor, thus both operators
access the spectrum pool jointly. In localized per half-building spectrum-sharing case,
the operators receive a spectrum usage favor for the entire building or half of the
building. By granting a favor over half of the building, an operator can access the
spectrum pool simultaneously at the other half of the building. Thus, the exchange
of small favors facilitates a fair utilization of the spectrum pool between the operators.
Due to the choice of either a small or big favor in the localized per half-building
spectrum sharing, the operators are to minimize their utility loss than that of the
localized per building spectrum sharing where the operators exchange only big favors.
20(a) and 20(b) shows the excess utility loss and gain for Operator 1 and Operator 2
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(a) Operator 1 Excess utility
(b) Operator 2 Excess utility
Figure 20: Excess utility loss and gain of Operator 1 and Operator 2 with 1 and 2
CCs with asymmetric mean load between the operators
with the localized per building and localized per half-building spectrum sharing case.
As the percentage of small and big favor an operator becomes almost equal, the excess
utility loss and gain from the localized per building and localized per half-building
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spectrum sharing scenarios shows a slight difference.
5.3 Summary
We have discussed a spectrum sharing at a building, half-building, and a big ge-
ographic area which consists of a number of buildings. We have evaluated and
discussed the simulation results for each considered spectrum sharing mechanisms
in comparison with the default orthogonal spectrum sharing scheme. From the
simulation results, we have observed that both operators benefit from both the
localized and non-localized spectrum sharing mechanism.
In the non-localized spectrum sharing case, it provides a major performance gain
for half of the users. However, the performance loss it results for almost 50 percent of
the users is unacceptable. The localized spectrum sharing, on the other hand results
a significant user rate improvement for both operators. There is a slight difference
between the results from the localized per half building and localized per building
spectrum sharing scenarios. This difference in the simulation results occurs due to
the distribution of the users in the given area.
In a situation where users dispersed throughout the building, a localized per
building spectrum sharing delivers more performance improvement to the system
than localized per half building. The more the users located close to their serving
base station, the more the localized per half-building spectrum sharing results a
better performance. Concerning a fair utilization of the spectrum pool between the
operators, the localized per half building spectrum sharing provides the best result
for both operators. Generally, we observed that during a spectrum sharing between
operators the difference in number of user of the operators at a building level makes
more difference than per big geographical area.
Overall, we can conclude that small scale spectrum sharing provides system
performance improvement than spectrum sharing at a big geographic area level.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis work presents a study of spectrum sharing between mobile network
operators. In the recent years, the concept of spectrum sharing has gained much
attention and popularity in the area of wireless mobile communication. Driven by
the enormous growth of wireless based applications and capacity starved UEs, MNOs
showed a significant interest towards DSA and flexible use of spectrum instead of
the traditional fixed spectrum allocation.
In this thesis, we study the problem of spectrum sharing between heterogeneous
mobile operators located at the same geographical area. We propose localized and
non-localized spectrum sharing between the operators based on the dimension of the
geographic area used for sharing. Without revealing operator specific information,
the operators participate in a repeated spectrum sharing game in a non-cooperative
basis. The main aim of the study was to demonstrate how spectrum sharing improves
MNOs delivered throughput. We intended to show how localized spectrum sharing
outperforms the non-localized spectrum sharing through numerical simulation. The
performance of these spectrum-sharing mechanisms evaluated in comparison to the
static orthogonal spectrum-sharing scheme.
Through simulation localized and non-localized spectrum sharing shown to pro-
vide significant performance improvement in terms of user throughput in comparison
to the static orthogonal spectrum sharing. From the simulation results, we observe
that the performance of the spectrum sharing mechanisms affected by the operators’
network traffic load, interference profile and users location. The main contribution of
this thesis was to show through simulation the performance gain obtained by the lo-
calized spectrum sharing over the non-localized and orthogonal spectrum sharing. In
the simulation results, we observed that the localized spectrum sharing outperforms
the non-localized spectrum sharing mechanism. We conclude that sharing a spectrum
at small scale provides a better performance, due to the fact that the variation of
operators network load at smaller areas makes difference than large geographical area.
6.2 Future Work
Based on what we have done in our research work, there are possible directions we
recommend for future work.
1. In the simulation, single story buildings have been considered for the case of
localized spectrum sharing. It could provide more interesting results, if more
challenging environment is taken, e.g., walls inside the buildings, corridors.
2. During the simulation, the interference from the indoor femto access points
to the outdoor users neglected with the assumption of thick outdoor walls.
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Considering this interference could lead to new avenues to the research and
could provide interesting find outs.
3. Increasing the number of operators participating in the spectrum sharing game
is one possible direction for future work. The simulation has been performed
with two operators instead it could provide a better improvement if it has been
performed for N operators.
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